on the Civil Service
Cannon House Office Building
Dear Mr. Chairman and Rep. Morella:
As you know, on September 24,
1991, the Subcommittee held a hearing concerning alleged improprieties in the directed
reassignments of two highranking career Senior Executive Service (SES) level
civil servants, Ms. Lorraine Mintzmyer, former Regional Director for the
National Park Service, and Mr. John Mumma, former Regional Forester for the
Forest. Service. That hearing launched a bipartisan investigation to determine
whether the directed reassignments of these two SES individuals were contrary
During the past fifteen months,
Subcommittee investigators have interviewed more than 45 witnesses and reviewed
over 6,000 documents in connection with these investigations. Based on the
evidence examined thus far, the Subcommittee concludes that the Department of
Interior engaged in a politically motivated, underhanded operation to destroy
an environmental document Ms. Mintzmyer headed. This activity resulted in the
improper directed reassignment of Ms. Mintzmyer.
I am transmitting the enclosed
staff report detailing the results of the Subcommittee's investigation into the
alleged improprieties of the directed reassignment of Ms. Mintzmyer.
L. Japinga, Chief Counsel
INTERFERENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS
BY POLITICAL APPOINTEES:
THE IMPROPER TREATMENT
OF A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE
1 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On September 24, 1991, the
Subcommittee on the Civil Service, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service,
held a hearing regarding alleged improprieties in the directed reassignments
of two high-ranking career Senior Executive Service (SES) level civil servants,
Ms. Lorraine Mintzmyer (National Park Service, Department of Interior) and Mr.
John Mumma (Forest Service, Department of Agriculture). That hearing was the first step in the Subcommittee's
investigation to determine whether the directed reassignments of these two SES
individuals were contrary to law or warranted additional legislative action by
At the time she was reassigned,
Ms. Mintzmyer was the first and only woman to serve as a National Park Service
(NPS) regional director and the most decorated female employee in its history.
Mr. Mumma was the first and only wildlife biologist to become a Forest Service
regional forester. The Subcommittee had received information that both
individuals were subjected to strong political and special interest pressures
to deviate from environmental laws and guidelines. When they refused to give
in, Ms. Mintzmyer and Mr. Mumma received directed reassignments which
substantially altered and effectively crippled their careers, harmed their
families, and led them both into accepting forced retirements in the ensuing
The Subcommittee viewed those
allegations with the utmost seriousness and concern, launching a bipartisan
investigation in September of 1991. In the past fifteen months, the
Subcommittee has interviewed more than 45 witnesses and reviewed over 6,000
documents in connection with this investigation. In addition, the Subcommittee
has identified significant missing documents 
and evidence that the Department of Interior (DOI) has failed to provide. This
staff report transmits the results of the Subcommittees investigation to date
into alleged improprieties in the directed reassignment of Ms. Mintzmyer.
account of her directed reassignment centered around the wholly political
revision of a joint National Park Service and Forest Service environmental
document, referred to as the "Vision document." The preparation of
this document was inspired by Congress, and Congress directed that the document
should facilitate protecting the Greater Yellowstone Area's ecosystem by developing
coordination guidelines between the National Park Service and the Forest
Service. This document was intended as a prototype for protecting the National
Parks from the Federal government misusing the public lands surrounding the
investigation has revealed an improper concerted activity by powerful
and special interest groups and the Bush Administration to eviscerate the DRAFT
Vision document because the commodity and special interest groups perceived it
as a threat. The Department of Interior and special interest groups first
destroyed the sixty page scientific document, turning it into a ten page
"brochure." They then developed a story that would explain the
revisions and keep their actions a secret. Finally, to protect their acts and
in apparent retaliation against Ms. Mintzmyer, the Department of Interior
effectuated a directed reassignment which moved Ms. Mintzmyer out of the Rocky
Mountain Region and away from the Vision document process.
The plan to revise the DRAFT
Vision document began to unravel, however, when the Subcommittee launched its
investigation into the matter. The Department of Interior's explanation for the
events leading up to the revision of the DRAFT Vision document are
contradictory and unsubstantiated. Further, Ms. Mintzmyer was subjected to
retaliatory acts after she was transferred to the Mid-Atlantic region, thus weakening
the Department's position.
The Subcommittee's Conclusions
The Subcommittee concludes that
the Department of Interior engaged in a politically motivated, underhanded
operation to destroy the DRAFT Vision document because it was unacceptable to
powerful and mooned commodity and special interest groups. This operation
resulted in the improper directed reassignment and subsequent retaliation
against Ms. Mintzmyer. The Subcommittee's conclusions are substantiated by the
• An unusual, closed meeting was
held on October 4, 1990, between high-ranking Department of Interior and
Agriculture officials, a western U.S. Congressional delegation, and commodity
and special interest groups. The sole purpose of this undocumented meeting
appears to have been to deal with the DRAFT Vision document. (Chapter 2, 3 and
• Mr. S.
Scott Sewell, then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks at the Department of Interior, effectuated the destruction of the DRAFT
Vision document by revising and taking control of the DRAFT document in October
of 1990 at the behest of John Sununu, former Chief of Staff for the White
House. (Chapter 2 and 4)
• At the Department of Interior, Mr.
Sewell and his staff revised the DRAFT Vision document outside of the public
review process to accommodate special interest requests during the fall and
winter of 1990, despite Mr. Sewell's denial, under oath, of revising or even
reviewing the DRAFT document prior to June 1991. (Chapters 2, 3, and 4)
• Mr. Sewell tried to complete the
operation by further neutralizing Ms. Mintzmyer in February of 1991 by
demanding she be reprimanded for allegedly lobbying the U.S. Congress. His
intent appears to have been to silence her or provide a basis for her directed
reassignment. (Chapters 2 and 4)
• Following the false lobbying
charge against Ms. Mintzmyer, the Department developed an explanation for how
the DRAFT Vision document went from a sixty page scientific document to a ten
page "brochure" and why the original drafting process for the DRAFT
document was altered. They accomplished this by utilizing the following
tactics: 1) closing previously planned national hearings to avoid anticipated
positive public comment; 2) assisting outside groups to "rig' the
appearance of negative public opinion at a few, select, local public meetings;
3) maneuvering the scientific interdisciplinary team, who had originally been
responsible for drafting the document, out of the revision process; and 4)
using the manufactured, negative, public comment to explain why the special
interest revisions were necessary. (Chapter 3)
Glaring Inconsistencies in the
The inconsistencies in
the Department's story were revealed on a number of fronts:
The participants at the October 4,
1990 meeting gave several contradictory explanations for the purpose of the
meeting and could not substantiate those explanations with any documents.
(Chapter 3 and 4)
Mr. Sewell originally denied,
under oath, that he and his office revised the DRAFT Vision document. Document
# 122, written by Mr. Sewell's staffer, directly contradicted that assertion
by stating that Mr. Sewell's office was revising the DRAFT Vision document in
line with special interest desires and Mr. Sewell was personally reviewing
those changes. (Chapter 4)
Well after document # 122 was
brought to his attention, Mr. Sewell changed his story in an unsworn statement
and asserted that he had instead formed a "working group" in his
office to review the DRAFT
document, not to revise it. However, Mr. Sewell and members of the working
group gave four separate, conflicting accounts of the group's mission. (Chapter
The baseless attack on Ms.
Mintzmyer for illegally lobbying Congress evaporated when Ms. Mintzmyer
challenged the lobbying charge and the charge then disappeared. (Chapter 4)
The numerous shifting reasons for
Ms. Mintzmyer's directed reassignment and the fact that Ms. Mintzmyer had
announced her plans for retirement prior to her directed reassignment
crippled the effectiveness of the Department's reasons for
her transfer. (Chapter 5)
After the directed reassignment,
the Department further retaliated against Ms. Mintzmyer by denying her a bonus
and an SES step increase. Additionally, her subordinates in the Mid-Atlantic
region were denied promotions and similar benefits and falsely told that Ms.
Mintzmyer was to blame for them not receiving those benefits. (Chapter 5)
CHAPTER 2-THE INITIAL DAYS OF THE
ACTS IN CONCERT
Genesis of the Vision Document
Yellowstone Vision document story began in the fall of 1985 when the House
Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks and Recreation held a joint
subcommittee hearing on the Greater Yellowstone Area (GYA). As a result of that
hearing, the National Park Service and the Forest Service were directed to
produce a document that 1) studied the present conditions of the greater
Yellowstone area, 2) developed goals to protect the ecosystem of the GYA, and
3) formalized coordinating principles between the Forest Service, the National
Park Service, and other federal agencies to provide protection of the
Yellowstone area for future generations. An interagency document, "A
Framework for Coordination of National Parks and National Forests in the
Greater Yellowstone Area," commonly referred to as the "Vision
document," was the product of this multi-agency project.
document project was coordinated through the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating
Committee (GYCC). The GYCC was created in the early 1960s and was comprised of
National Park Service and Forest Service managers.
capacity as Regional Director for the National Park Service for the Rocky
Mountain Region, Ms. Lorraine Mintzmyer was assigned to the position of
co-chair of the GYCC and was to oversee the development of the Vision document,
along with her counterpart in the Forest Service, Mr. Gary Cargill, then the
former Regional Forester, Region 2.
facilitate the development and coordination of the Vision document, in 1988 a
joint GYCC project office was opened in Billings, Montana. Each agency named a
team leader for the Billings office who had the daily responsibility for
running the office and guiding a team of scientific professionals from the
Forest Service and the National Park Service in their development of the Vision
document. This group of scientific professionals was referred to as the
interdisciplinary, or "ID," team. Ms. Sandra Key was the team leader
for the National Park Service and her counterpart in the Forest Service was Mr.
The ID team was first tasked with the project of developing a
set of goals for preserving and managing Yellowstone's ecosystem. Once those
goals were developed and released in December 1989, the public was invited to
comment on them. The GYCC received 590 letters and 4,850 specific comments on
the proposed goals. The ID team then used that public comment to revise the
goals in March through July
of 1990 and those revised goals became the foundation of the Vision document.
A 60 page DRAFT of the Vision document, entitled "Vision for
the Future: A Framework for the Coordination in the Greater Yellowstone
Area," was released on August 14, 1990 for public response.
The Acts in Concert
After the release of the DRAFT Vision document, an operation to
eviscerate the DRAFT document began to take shape. On August 22, 1990, members
of a western U.S. Congressional delegation wrote to Secretary Lujan requesting
a meeting with him to discuss their concerns regarding the DRAFT Vision
While the Subcommittee has not been able to determine if a meeting
between Secretary Lujan and the U.S. Congressional delegation occurred, on
October 4, 1990, a meeting did take place between high-ranking representatives
of the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, U.S. Senators and
Representatives, and members of various commodity and special interest groups.
According to witnesses, the following individuals attended: then Deputy
Principal Assistant Secretary Scott Sewell, Department of Interior, then Assistant
Secretary Moseley, Department of Agriculture, Mr. Jack Morehead, Associate
Director for Park Operations, NPS, Mr. Cy Jamison, Director of the Bureau of
Land Management, Mr. T.S. Ary, Director of the Bureau of Mines, Mr. George
Leonard, Associate Chief of the Forest Service, Mr. Gary Cargill, Regional
Forester for the Forest Service, Senator Simpson, Senator Wallop, Rep. Thomas,
an aide to Senator Simpson, an aide to Representative Thomas, Ms. Carolyn
Paseneaux, Wyoming Woolgrowers Association, Mr. Dave Flinter, Wyoming Farm
Bureau, and Mr. Warren Martin, Wyoming Heritage Society.
On the day immediately following the October 4, 1990 meeting, Ms.
Mintzmyer, who was also in Washington, D.C. at the time, was summoned to the
office of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks,
S. Scott g well. During this meeting, Mr. Sewell began to effectuate the
destruction of the DRAFT Vision document. In sworn testimony before the Subcommittee,
Ms. Mintzmyer stated the following:
[I] sat across from Mr. Sewell
with my notebook and some other papers on my lap. He began a lecture on the
fact that significant political contacts and pressures had been made to the
White House and the Secretary regarding the Vision document by political
delegations. He then stated that Mr. Sununu had personally spoken to him about
this issue. He stated that Mr. Sununu told him that, from a political
perspective, the existing draft of the Vision document was a disaster and must
be rewritten ....
made it clear that he had been delegated by the Department to retain the appearance that the document was the product of professional and
scientific efforts by the agency involved but the reality would be that the
document would be revised based on these political concerns, some of which he shared
with me at the time. He also made it very clear that he was upset with me personally because of the draft and that
he had, therefore, taken over control of the writing and content of that
document. He was emphatic as to that point, stating that I should proceed but
that it was he who would ultimately control and revise all contents.
After Ms. Mintzmyer was told that the DRAFT Vision document was a
political disaster and was to be "politically" redrafted, the DRAFT
document ceased to be an internal National Park Service and Forest Service
project. The Department of Interior acted after the October 4 meeting to revise
the DRAFT Vision document to meet the needs of commodity and special interest
groups. Circumstantial evidence also suggests that the Department of
Agriculture (USDA) was involved in the operation. According to evidence the
Subcommittee has obtained, Mr. Scott Sewell, DOI, was the principal force
behind the activities to destroy the DRAFT Vision document.
Immediately thereafter, during the week of October 14, 1990, Mr.
Barry Davis, Supervisor of the Shoshone National Forest, and Mr. Brian Stout,
Supervisor of the Bridger-Teton National Forest, met with several commodity and
special interest groups hostile to the DRAFT Vision document and other
individuals to discuss the DRAFT document. In a December 4, 1990 memo, the
results of the meetings with the various commodity and special interest groups
and individuals were relayed to the GYCC. These solicitations were peculiar
because they began just ten days after the October 4, 1990 meeting and opinions
from these groups and individuals were suddenly and inexplicably gathered
outside of the process set forth in the Federal Register 
for obtaining public comment.
The Department of Interior moved further
into the operation on October 23, 1990 when Mr. Sewell began his firsthand
alteration of the DRAFT Vision document by directing Ms. Mary Bradford, his
subordinate, to go through the DRAFT document and focus on the tone of the
document and Department of Interior issues.
On October 25, 1990, staffers for Mr. Sewell-Ms. Bradford, Mr. Jim Loach, Mr.
Joe Doddridge, and Ms. Meredith Kimbro--were directed to "[b]egin review
of YELL-Vision document...." 
This review continued through the month of October and into November of 1990. 
Once Mr. Sewell's staffers were through
with their preliminary revisions, they passed a briefing copy of their efforts
on to Ms. Constance Harriman, then Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks, DOI. Ms. Bradford wrote in a November 14, 1990 revised Vision
document transmittal memo 
to Ms. Harriman that "Loach, Kimbro, Doddridge and I met to incorporate
comments received so far, and in response to Scott's meeting with Senators
Simpson, Wallop and commodities groups." Ms. Bradford's transmittal memo specifically noted
that "Scott is now reviewing this." The transmittal memo also stated
that the USDA/Forest Service was pursuing concurrent review of the DRAFT
document. Thus, changes were definitely being made pursuant to Mr. Sewell's
input from special interests.
Pressure to change the DRAFT Vision document
also was felt by the Department of Agriculture: On December 10, 1990, a U.S.
Senator sent a letter to Assistant Secretary Moseley (DOA) thanking him for
his time at the October 4, 1990 meeting. In his letter, the Senator cautioned
Mr. Moseley to give his full personal attention and review to the DRAFT Vision
document before it became final. 
On January 31, 1991 the joint coordination between the Departments
of Interior and Agriculture for watering down the DRAFT Vision document was
cemented when Deputy Assistant Secretary Beuter (USDA) and Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary Sewell (DOI) met for a one-on-one meeting to discuss the
DRAFT Vision document. Mr. Sewell set up the meeting originally with Assistant
Secretary Moseley, but Mr. Moseley did not attend. Instead, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Beuter acted for USDA on this issue. 
The next day, on February 1, 1991, a meeting of the managers of
the GYCC in Billings, Montana concluded the active concerted action-knowingly
or perhaps unknowingly. At this meeting, Forest Supervisor Brian Stout
unexpectedly presented a previously unseen 15 page revised DRAFT Vision
document for the managers to consider. This rewrite became the basis of the
managers' subsequent rewrite of the DRAFT Vision document, despite the fact
that the public comment period had not yet closed and that the ID team was
originally tasked with the responsibility for rewriting the DRAFT document
after the public comment period had concluded.
Thus, Mr. Stout's draft appeared out of nowhere-public comment was not
incorporated into the Stout draft and the professional scientific ID team was
cut out of the rewrite process. It is also unexplained why a single employee's
draft replaced several years of prior effort by a group of employees
specifically chosen for the task.
On February 11, 1991, Assistant Secretary Moseley sent a letter to
Senator Simpson indicating that he would review the DRAFT Vision document prior
to the final publication.
Mr. Moseley assured Senator Simpson that the entire DRAFT Vision document
process was sensitive and that he would give the effort his personal attention.
Mr. Sewell continued his behind the scenes influence over the
DRAFT Vision document at the Department of Interior well into 1991. Document
#78 indicates that Sewell made changes to the draft Vision document personally
as late as March 20, 1991.
attempted to complete the objective of the concerted action when he demanded on
March 21, 1991, that Ms. Mintzmyer be reprimanded for illegally lobbying Members of Congress. Ms.
Mintzmyer defended herself against this charge in a memo to the Director of the
National Park Service. Mr. Sewell's efforts failed, however. Neither the
Department of Interior nor the National Park Service ever responded to her memo
nor was she disciplined for this alleged activity.
Thus, the operation pursued the
unusual meeting on October 4, 1990 between high-ranking Department of Interior
and Agriculture officials, a western U.S. Congressional delegation, and
commodity and special interest groups occurred to deal with the DRAFT Vision
Scott Sewell, then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks at the Department of Interior, effectuated the destruction of the
DRAFT Vision document by revising and taking control of the DRAFT document in
October of 1990 and by suppressing Ms. Mintzmyer's participation on October 5,
Forest Service skirted the process for gathering public comment delineated in a
November 22, 1989 Federal Register notice by soliciting comments from commodity
and special interest groups outside of the officially scheduled public meetings.
4. At the Department
of Interior, Mr. Sewell and his staff revised the DRAFT Vision document during
the fall and winter of 1990.
DRAFT document was effectively politically rewritten when Mr. Brian Stout,
Forest Supervisor for the Bridger-Teton National Forest, unexpectedly produced
a greatly reduced, 15 page revised DRAFT Vision document at the February 1,
1991 GYCC meeting.
6. Mr. Sewell continued to revise
the DRAFT Vision document as late as March 20, 1991.
Finally, Mr. Sewell tried to achieve the objectives of the concerted action by
demanding that on March 21, 1991 Ms. Mintzmyer be reprimanded for allegedly
lobbying Congress. That charge was never substantiated and no action was taken
after Ms. Mintzmyer contested it.
CHAPTER 3-KEEPING THE CONCERTED
phase of the operation to revise the DRAFT Vision document centered on
obscuring the fact that an improper concerted action was forcing changes to the
DRAFT document. The Department of Interior was faced with the challenge of
explaining how the DRAFT Vision document went from a sixty page scientific document
down to a ten page "brochure." The Department, in concert with
others, needed to develop a plausible reason for explaining why radical changes
in content were occurring and why the original drafting process was being
altered. They accomplished these goals by utilizing the following tactics: 1)
closing previously planned national hearings to avoid anticipated positive
public comment; 2) employing outside groups to "rig" the appearance
of negative public opinion at a few, select, local public meetings; 3) maneuvering
the scientific interdisciplinary team out of the revision process, and 4)
using the manufactured, negative, public comment to explain why the revisions
were allegedly necessary.
this phase opponents of the DRAFT document needed to be able to argue that it
was negative public comment that required and explained their changes to the
DRAFT Vision document. Influencing the public comment, however, was not an
easy task because the National Park Service had designed an explicit process
for soliciting balanced public comment on the DRAFT document.
In the Federal Register on November 22, 1989, the National Park
Service published a formal process that the Forest Service and the National
Park Service would follow for gathering public comment on the DRAFT Vision
According to the notice in the Federal Register, obtaining and incorporating
the public's comment into the Vision document was expected in all of the DRAFT
document's developmental phases. This was evident in the first phase of the
Developing the Vision Document
In preparing the Vision document, a series of preliminary goals
for managing the greater Yellowstone area's ecosystem were developed by the ID
team and those goals were used as the basis for the DRAFT Vision document.
Before these goals were formalized, however, agencies, organizations, and
other interested parties were invited to comment. A significant level of comment was received.
Once public input was received on the
preliminary goals, that input was incorporated into the preliminary goals by
the ID team. The ID team synthesized the results and created a draft goal booklet-the
precursor to the DRAFT Vision document. The public was then asked to comment on the draft goal booklet in a second
round of public discussion using a more structured public participation
process. After this public comment was received, the GYCC continued to work
with interested parties where differences existed as to the content of the goal
booklet. Where resolution was not possible, the agencies decided how to resolve
Due to overwhelming response, obtaining the public's thoughts on
the goal booklet was successful in the steps prior to the release of DRAFT
Vision document. The GYCC received 590 letters and 4,850 specific comments on
the goal booklet. The majority of these comments
After this extensive public comment
was incorporated into the goal booklet, the ID team used this booklet as the
basis for preparing the first DRAFT of the Vision document, which was released
on July 17, 1990. The DRAFT Vision document emphasized a sense of naturalness
and maintenance of the integrity of the GYA's ecosystem. A term used for this
concept was ' biodiversity." This emphasis was derived from scientific
studies  and an analysis of
the public's comments received on the draft goal booklet. The release of the
DRAFT Vision document also marked the beginning of the third and final round of
Once the DRAFT Vision document was
released, the National Park Service and Forest Service managers of the GYCC met
August 13 and 14, 1990 to discuss the process for incorporating the public's
comment into the DRAFT document. The managers decided that comment would be
acquired through letters and workshops and that after the final round of public
comment was completed, the ID team would
interpret and incorporate that comment into the initial draft of the final
Vision document. Once the ID team had completed its task of incorporating the
public's comments, the GYCC managers would then review the document and finish
the final edits.
Gathering Public Comment
To seek actual public comment on the DRAFT
Vision document--within the confines of the notice published in the Federal
Register-a series of eight GYCC public comment workshops were scheduled within
the states of Montana, Wyoming and Idaho and several national workshops were
scheduled in major cities. The sessions were developed around a workshop
format, which split participants into small groups and each group met with a
member of the GYCC to discuss their concerns and comments. This format was
chosen because it provided an opportunity for the GYCC to get in depth comments from the public
on the DRAFT Vision document and it gave the National Park Service and the
Forest Service an opportunity to explain the various initiatives contained in
the DRAFT document.
Using a hearing format as an additional method for gathering
public comment was specifically rejected by the GYCC at that time. The GYCC
felt this was an undesirable option because hearings would not give every
person the opportunity to speak fully, the hearing format would be too formal,
and the hearings might become a vehicle for groups in favor of and opposed to
the Vision document to "grandstand."
Acts by the Participants in the
extensive plans for gathering public comment and revising the DRAFT Vision
document quickly unraveled when those plans conflicted with the operation to
alter the DRAFT Vision document. It appears the operation originated in the period from August to October
of 1990. During this period, three events occurred. First, the Department of
Interior and others decided that the DRAFT document was unacceptable due to
pressure from commodity groups. Second, changes to the document began to take
place outside of the normal revision process. Third, DOI and others devised a
plan to explain these revisions by attributing them to artificially produced
negative public comment on the DRAFT Vision document. To rely on this negative
public comment as the explanation for the extensive changes in the DRAFT
document, a plan that involved several simultaneous efforts was launched.
The Concerted Activity Unfolding
appears to have been precipitated by a letter  from Mr. David Rovig,
President of Crown Butte Mining, to Secretary Lujan on August 3, 1990.
In the letter, Mr. Rovig requested that Secretary Lujan delay the release of
the DRAFT Vision document.
Rovig's letter did not languish within the Department of Interior. The letter
received the immediate attention of the Deputy Principal Assistant Secretary
for Fish Wildlife and Parks, Scott Sewell. Further, the DOI response was
expedited, requiring an answer within four days of receipt of the letter.
The Department's attention to the mining interest's displeasure with the DRAFT
Vision document was indicative of the Department's willingness to accommodate
commodity and special interest groups' concerns regarding the DRAFT Vision
A western U.S.
Congressional delegation also expressed concern about the DRAFT document. On
August 22, 1990, the delegation sent a letter to Secretary Lujan expressing
their view that the DRAFT document "[m]ay be quite disruptive to
communities and private landowners in the Greater Yellowstone area."  The letter also sought a personal meeting between the Secretary and the Wyoming
Again, the Department's response was noteworthy. The Congressional
delegation's letter received the personal attention of the Assistant Secretary
for Fish Wildlife and Parks and her Principal Deputy. In addition, that letter
was important enough to have been included in a briefing book for Secretary
On September 10, 1990, the first attempt to pressure the public comment
process occurred when the western Congressional delegation sent Ms. Mintzmyer
a letter requesting that the public comment period for the DRAFT Vision
document be extended to January 1991.
The delegation suddenly wanted the public comment period lengthened to ensure a
more thorough review even though extensive public comment on the precursor to
the DRAFT Vision document, the goals and the goal booklet, had already been
through at least a six month public comment process. Extending the public comment
period also provided the DRAFT Vision document's opponents more time to
mobilize their forces.
October 4, 1990 marked a critical day in the rewrite of the DRAFT
Vision document. A number of the participants in the concerted activity were
present on October 4, 1990 in Washington, D.C. to discuss potential changes to
the DRAFT Vision document. These changes were aimed at making the DRAFT
document conform to the desires of the commodity and special interest groups.
Several characteristics of this meeting indicate that a concerted activity was
First, the meeting was scheduled in a
decidedly nonpublic. The representatives from the commodity and special
interest groups were primarily located in the western part of the United
States, not Washington, D.C. Even though this meeting was held in Washington,
D.C., the Subcommittee never has received any documents indicating invitations
to this meeting or confirmations of attendance at this meeting. Further, Ms.
Mintzmyer was not invited to the meeting. The location of the meeting indicates
that extensive planning would have had to have occurred if all parties were to
meet in Washington. It is logical to conclude that the Department would have
had time to contact Ms. Mintzmyer in advance of the meeting to request her
attendance. In fact, that very process occurred with Gary Cargill, the other
co-chair. He was contacted at least a week or two in advance of the meeting and
told to plan to attend.
The absence of certain attendees
also indicates that there was something unusual about the meeting. The most
obvious omission was the National Park Service's chief architect and advocate
of the DRAFT Vision document, Lorraine Mintzmyer. Also missing from the meeting
was another key player, the Director of the National Park Service, James
Ridenour. In a sworn statement before investigator Davis Schaff on Monday,
March 23, 1992, Director Ridenour stated the following concerning the October
4, 1990 meeting,
A: [Director Ridenour] Well, there was a meeting, as I understand. I do
not recall why I was not in the meeting, whether I was on the road or what. And
again, I do not know whose office it was in. But it was my understanding that
some of the western Congressmen went into a discussion. And there have been
also people who had come in from the West. They went into a discussion over
their concern over the document. I think that Mr. Sewell attended that meeting.
It was not a meeting that I attended.
Thus, neither the National Park
Service's co-chair for the Vision project, nor her boss, Director Ridenour,
attended this meeting critical of the DRAFT document.
Further doubt is cast on the October 4, 1990 meeting because
participants from the commodity and special interest groups and the western
Congressional delegation were opposed to the DRAFT document. According to his
actions and comments, the Department of Interior representative, Mr. Sewell,
was also opposed to the DRAFT document. His opposition was notable for what he
did not do. Mr. Sewell did not discuss the meeting with the Director of the
National Park Service-the individual ultimately responsible for the DRAFT
Vision document. The Director noted in his sworn statement,
Q: [Mr. Schaff] So he [Scott Sewell] did not talk to you about that meeting
[October 4, 1990]?
Mr. Sewell did voice his opposition to the DRAFT document to Ms.
Mintzmyer, however. In a meeting in his office on October 5, 1990, Ms.
Mintzmyer testified under oath that Mr. Sewell expressed the following sentiments
regarding the DRAFT Vision document:
He began a lecture on the fact
that significant political contacts and pressures had been made to the White
House and the Secretary regarding the Vision document by political delegations.
He then stated that Mr. Sununu had personally spoken to him about this issue.
He stated that Mr. Sununu told him that, from a political perspective, the
existing draft of the Vision document was a disaster and must be rewritten....
Mr. Sewell made it clear that he
had been delegated by the Department to retain the appearance that the document
was the product of professional and scientific efforts by the agency involved
but the reality would be that the document would be revised based on these
political concerns, some of which he shared with me at the time.
Finally, the third event that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
meeting was the fact that the meeting's existence was not publicly revealed
until much later. As best Subcommittee investigators can discern, the October
4, 1990 meeting was not revealed until after Ms. Mintzmyer's testimony before
the Subcommittee in September of 1991.
In mid-October, the Forest
Service acted outside of the public comment process published in the Federal
Register by conducting several meetings closed to the general public with
various special interest groups hostile to the DRAFT Vision document.
There was no question that these meetings were scheduled pursuant to the
October 4, 1990 meeting. As a memo written by members of the Multiple Use
As you know, several members of
the Multiple Use Coalition met with the Wyoming Congressional Delegation and
representatives from the Forest Service and Park Service in Washington last
week to discuss the Vision document. As a result of that meeting, Brian Stout
has asked individual members of the Coalition to meet with him on a one-to-one
The Vision document process was
further tampered with on November 6, 1990 when a staffer for a western U.S.
Representative insisted that the GYCC change the format of the public comment
meetings. The Representative's office wanted the GYCC to conduct the meetings
in a hearing format, instead of following the previously agreed upon workshop
format. In response to the Representative's insistence, the GYCC acquiesced by
instituting a combination of workshops and hearings. In the afternoons,
designated GYCC members were available to meet with the public in workshops to
discuss the DRAFT Vision document. In the evenings, the GYCC held hearings on
the DRAFT document.
The hearing format mandated by
the Representative's office gave the DRAFT Vision document's critics a means
for generating artificially negative public comment. The individuals and
groups involved in the concerted activity demonstrated the effectiveness of
this plan in Montana. All three of the public meetings held in the Big Sky
State were contentious. A so-called grass roots organization, People for the
West!,  had organized a coalition of multiple use 
supporters to oppose the document in the State of Montana. As Mr. Troyer noted
in a December 17, 1990 summary of the public comment hearings, the fifth public
comment meeting held on December 10, 1990 in Billings, Montana went as
Most spoke against the document
as is. An emerging group "People for the West' dominated the meeting and
handed out yellow arm ribbons and lapel pins to supporters of multiple
use." Kurt Christensen from Congressman Marlenee's staff began the input
with a letter from the Congressman critical of the process and document.
Upon questioning the participants,
very few had actually read the document and were testifying solely on what they
had been led to believe the impact the DRAFT document would be, rather than
what the effect of the DRAFT document actually would have.
This trend continued at the other
two Montana public meetings. The sixth meeting on December 12, 1990 in Ennis,
Montana was also contentious. Ms. Key stated in a memo to Jerry Tays regarding
the meeting: "This was a completely staged event ...."
The eighth, and final meeting, in
Bozeman, Montana on January 24, 1991, was the most antagonistic meeting of the
eight hearings. In an interview with Subcommittee investigators, Ms. Key stated
that this meeting was "totally out of control" and very polarized.
She summed up the meeting by noting that from then on, the Bozeman meeting was
used to typify the public's perception of the DRAFT document, despite the
previous positive or balanced meetings.
Mr. Troyer endorsed Ms. Key's
perception when he wrote about the meeting on January 25, 1991:
It was indeed the grand finale the interest groups wanted to
create.... The comment began with Senator Burns staffer Denny Rehberg reading a
statement .... He then, however, asked the audience to stand up FOR and
Against.... Betty did make a point of explaining our public comment process and
that it was not simply vote counting.
This analysis of the true nature of
the limited attack on the Vision document which was carried out solely in
Montana was addressed by Representative Williams during the Subcommittee's
September 24, 1991 hearing:
MR. WILLIAMS. How did your people define that session [the
public meetings in Montana on the DRAFT Vision document]? Any different than
MS. MINTZMYER. The Montana situation was characterized-and
I have telephone call records of that and also actual reports that they
characterized it in terms like "witch hunt," "a roust."
There were people there at the Montana session who were accusing us of taking
food out of their mouths. I mean it was an incredible kind of demonstration
when, if one read the document, one could only conclude that-that there had
been a lot of effort to perhaps raise undue expectations about what the
document was going to do and what it could do.
MR. WILLIAMS. Was the crowd in Montana [at the public
hearings on the DRAFT Vision document] any larger than the attendance at other
sessions, do you know?
MS. MINTZMYER. It was much, much
higher attendance at the Montana meetings than there were in other States.
WILLIAMS. Well, that's probably what happens when Members of Congress turn
their staff over to try to generate a crowd of people, because some Members of
Congress did precisely that, turned their staff over into doing things like
being sure that large numbers of people showed up, ordering buses, helping to
park the buses in the parking lots outside of the meeting.
While it is not within the purview
of Subcommittee investigators to examine the acts of Congressional delegations
and their staff, it suffices to say that extraordinary outside pressure was
brought under the guise of populist comment, and that the perception of
substantial public comment hostile to the DRAFT document was, in reality,
almost entirely manufactured. This analysis is substantiated by the fact that
only the meetings held in Montana engendered such overwhelming negative
comment. All of the meetings held in Wyoming produced public comment that was
either balanced or in favor of the document. In fact, in a meeting held in
Idaho Falls, Idaho on January 10, 1991, public comment on the DRAFT document
was balanced, despite the fact that the meeting was sandwiched in between the
three overwhelmingly negative Montana meetings.
Oddly, the destruction of the DRAFT Vision document was anticipated
by Mr. Troyer in January, 1991. Prior to the final Bozeman, Montana public
meeting, Jack Troyer mysteriously described, in a January 22, 1991 memo, what
the final Vision document would look like, even though the evidence for drawing
this conclusion was not yet available. To the contrary, the evidence that had
been collected at that time suggested an opposite conclusion--that the public was
in favor of the DRAFT document as it stood. Yet, Mr. Troyer seemed to know how
the document would be rewritten despite the facts: 1) that the public meetings
had not been completed, 2) that only two of the seven public comment meetings
were overwhelmingly opposed to the document, and 3) that the public comment
period for submitting written comment had not ended.
In his memo describing the revised DRAFT Vision document, Mr.
Troyer correctly stated that the final Vision document would be no longer than
15 pages, it would clearly state the separateness of the Forest Service and
National Park Service agency missions, it would disclaim the relationship to
private lands, and it would replace the words "sense of
naturalness." Ironically, in the same memo Mr. Troyer stated,
The publication of the goal
booklet and now this document in draft form has hopefully allowed ample time
for a thorough airing of this important process. It is important to note that
this is indeed a draft designed to seek public participation before
Mr. Troyer's sudden emphasis of the critical importance of negative
public comment seems to explain his prescience with regard to the content of
the final Vision document.
On January 25, 1991, Mr. Troyer
allowed opponents of the DRAFT Vision document more time to generate negative
public comment by recommending, in response to a Congressional request, the
extension of the public comment period from January 31, 1991 to early February,
On February 1, 1991, Forest
Supervisor Brian Stout suddenly introduced a reduced, fifteen page DRAFT
Vision document for consideration during a meeting of the GYCC's Forest
Service supervisors and the National Park Service superintendents manager's
meeting. At this time, public comment had not yet concluded. At this meeting,
the managers decided to rewrite the DRAFT Vision document themselves based on
this suddenly appearing draft, instead of having the ID team review and
rewrite the DRAFT Vision document as was previously decided in August of 1990.
At this point, the prognosis for retaining a scientific document,
responsive to public comment, was not favorable. Mary Ann Grasser, an ID team
member, told Subcommittee investigators that she knew the DRAFT Vision document
was dead when the mysterious Stout draft appeared. Ms. Grasser noted that in
all of her 17 years with the National Park Service she had never seen managers
take over a document.
Finally, in a
wrap-up article on the Vision document, Yellowstone's Superintendent Bob
Barbee, Environmental Specialist Paul Schullery, and Chief Research Biologist
John Varley knew that it wasn't public comment that ruined the process, but
rather it was pressure from special interests that sank the DRAFT Vision document.
The trio wrote,
It would be nice and neat to
simply say that we outran public sentiment with the Vision. But we don't
believe that is what happened. Public
sentiment did not have a great deal to do with the process. The American public,
the owners of the parks and forests of the greater Yellowstone area, played virtually no role at all. What we failed to do, in fact was
engage public sentiment in the first place. Attempts to hold hearings on the
Vision in other parts of the country-far from the intense local
pressures-failed; some within the two agencies were gun shy, for some reason,
about going that far afield, and money was short. So we were faced with a
powerful regional campaign, superbly
engineered by special interest groups and featuring stunning inflammatory
rhetoric against the Vision. We failed to convincingly invite the pro-Vision
interests to mobilize adequately. We failed to foresee the sort of opposition
the Vision-which we saw as a mild-mannered and obviously sensible,
conservative document-could generate. And we failed, in the face of that
opposition, to keep hold of as much as possible in the draft. (Emphasis added.)
This engineering by special interests to which these National Park
Service employees referred clearly stemmed from both the special interests'
possession of their opponents' playbook, and from the cooperation of several of
the Administration s key players.
In summing up the attempts to keep
the concerted activity a secret, the following scenario emerged:
1. The individuals and groups
involved in the concerted activity artificially manufactured the appearance of
negative public opinion at a few, select, local public meetings.
2. Mr. Sewell closed down previously scheduled national hearings
to avoid anticipated positive comment.
3. The scientific interdisciplinary (ID) team was maneuvered out
of the revision process.
4. The participants used the manufactured, negative, public
comment to explain why the revisions were allegedly necessary.
CHAPTER 4-CONCERTED ACTIVITY UNRAVELLING
elements of the acts of the participants in the concerted activity have been
revealed in the Subcommittee's investigation of the Mintzmyer directed
reassignment. Many of the statements and positions of these participants are
either contradictory and contrary to the overwhelming documentary evidence, or
the participants have provided multiple explanations to describe a single
October 4, 1990 meeting
A major blow
to any assertion of legitimacy to the October 4, 1990 meeting is illustrated by
the inconsistent statement made by former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Scott Sewell. His statement directly
contradicts other testimony and evidence the Subcommittee gathered regarding
the discussions and actions in and around the October 4, 1990 meeting.
In an August 12, 1992 letter to
the Subcommittee on the Civil Service, Mr. Sewell sought to characterize the
October 4, 1990 meeting in the following manner:
The purpose of the October 4,
meeting was simply to ask for a fair public review; the constituents believed they
had been excluded from full review of the document to that time. (Emphasis
Morehead, then Associate Director of Operations, National Park Service,
recently attempted to support Mr. Sewell's position in a July 31, 1992
unsworn, written statement. In the absence of any contemporaneous supporting
documentation, Mr. Morehead stated,
The main topic of discussion
centered around the feeling by the special interest groups that they had not
been allowed to participate fully enough in the preparation of the Vision Document
and, when they did make comments through the public input process, their input
had not been adequately reflected in the draft document.
These statements are an inaccurate representation of what occurred
at the meeting for a number of reasons. First, the timing of these statements
and the lack of corroborating evidence casts doubt on Mr. Sewell's version of
the events. For example, neither the Department of Interior, the National Park
Service, Mr. Sewell nor Mr. Morehead provided the Subcommittee with any written
notes, correspondence, planning materials, or other documents from the period
surrounding the October 4, 1990 meeting to substantiate their recollection of
what happened.  Instead, both
gave unsworn statements almost a year after Ms. Mintzmyer testified under oath
before the Subcommittee and after additional evidence supporting Ms.
Mintzmyer's view had been released. Also, they both relied on their
memories to reconstruct an event which took place almost two years earlier.
Next, Mr. Morehead's and Mr. Sewell's views are in direct conflict
with the account and contemporaneous October 4, 1990 meeting notes Mr. Gary
Cargill, former Regional Forester for the Forest Service, provided to the Subcommittee. In a February 24,
1992 meeting with Subcommittee investigators, Mr. Cargill stated that during
the October 4, 1990 meeting the commodity and special interest groups were
critical of the substance of the DRAFT document; he did not say the groups
were critical of the process for developing the DRAFT document.
Notes Mr. Cargill took during the October
4, 1990 meeting substantiate the view that discussions during the meeting
centered on the substantive content of the DRAFT document, not on the public
comment process. For example, Mr. Cargill's notes reflected the following
discussions: Ms. Paseneaux, a representative for the Wyoming Woolgrowers
Association, complained about principal terms in the DRAFT document like
"biodiversity."  Mr.
Warren Martin, a representative of Wyoming Oil and Gas, stated that the DRAFT
document was "no advantage to Wyoming" and if the DRAFT were
"torn up, no tears [would be shed] except in Jackson County." 
The only time Mr. Cargill's notes mentioned the alleged public
process as the basis for the meeting, that reference clashed with Mr. Sewell's
and Mr. Morehead's assertion that the meeting's participants felt the public
process was insufficient. To the contrary, Senator Wallop indicated that the
DRAFT document process was more formal than it warranted, referring to the
hearings on the DRAFT document and the Federal Register notice as proof that
the process was too formal.
Finally, Mr. Cargill's statement of the events of the October 4,
1990 meeting were supported by a conversation between Mr. Sewell and Director
Ridenour. In a sworn statement given on March 23, 1992, Director Ridenour made
it clear that substance, not process, was the focus of the meeting:
He [Mr. Sewell] talked to me
about a concern that primarily the western states delegations that were
primarily affected by the Vision document would be or were upset, and that they were concerned that it was a document
that was going to turn the entire Yellowstone area into more like a park-like
philosophy, rather than having the continuing multiple use philosophy that
surrounds the park and the National Forest. (Emphasis added.) 
Director Ridenour did not testify that Mr. Sewell had concerns about the review process the DRAFT
document underwent in the agency and the Department, instead, Mr. Sewell talked
to the Director about the criticisms of the principal substantive points of
the document. Mr. Sewell's shifting explanation of the intent behind the
October 4, 1990 meeting and evidence contradicting his August 12, 1992
explanation about the meeting make it clear that the conspiracy to destroy the
DRAFT Vision document was either formulated during or contemporaneous to the
October 4, 1990 meeting.
October 5, 1990 meeting
The next indication that an improper concerted activity was underway
occurred during a meeting between Ms. Mintzmyer and Mr. Sewell on October 5,
1990. Again, Mr. Sewell's account of the meeting differed sharply with the
sworn testimony of Ms. Mintzmyer and interviews with other witnesses.
In his August 12, 1992 letter, Mr. Sewell states he told Ms.
Mintzmyer on October 5, 1990 that he and the western U.S. Congressional
delegation were concerned that there was not a fair public review of the DRAFT
Vision document prior to its release.
[A] meeting took place between
Ms. Mintzmyer and me [Mr. Sewell] at which time I expressed my disappointment
over her handling of the Vision document from
a procedural standpoint. I pointed out that if the document had received
proper National Park Service and Departmental review before it was signed, the
Congressional meeting would probably never have had to occur. I then
told her what process we would follow in allowing a more full and fair airing
of the issue.
the absence of even a single supporting memo or meeting note, Mr. Sewell relied
on his memory to reconstruct a two year old event. Further, he provided his
version of the events to the Subcommittee in an unsworn statement. Finally, Mr.
Sewell did not submit any contemporaneous evidence regarding October 5, 1990
meeting to support his recollection.
Ms. Mintzmyer, on the other hand, testified under oath from contemporaneous
notes that on October 5, 1990 Mr. Sewell told her that the White House and Mr.
Sununu said the DRAFT document was a "political disaster" and that it
had to be completely rewritten at the direction of Mr. Sununu, then White
House Chief of Staff. Mr. Sewell went on to direct Ms. Mintzmyer that he would
take control of the writing and content of the document.
Two witnesses, Ms. Sandra Key and Mr. Jack Morehead, also
confirmed Ms. Mintzmyer's recollection of the meeting's events. Immediately
after leaving Mr. Sewell's office following the October 5, 1990 meeting, Ms.
Mintzmyer told Ms. Key in detail about Mr. Sewell's plan to rewrite and take
control of the DRAFT document due to political pressure. Ms. Key noted for the
Ms. Mintzmyer was visibly
distraught and that her face was "ashen" following that meeting.
Mr. Jack Morehead also confirmed
Mr. Sewell's directions. According to Ms. Mintzmyer's contemporaneous notes of the October 5, 1990 conversation,
Mr. Morehead told her that the DRAFT Vision document had to be rewritten and
that Mr. Sewell had made a commitment to rewrite the DRAFT Vision document.
Finally, Mr. Sununu's concern
about the DRAFT Vision document filtered its way down to the Forest Service.
In a memo prepared on April 25, 1991, Mr. David Behler, a Department of Interior
Manager Development Program participant, wrote the following:
He Jack Troyer] also mentioned
that there is some word that John Sununu has contacted Agriculture Secretary
Edward Madigan and told him to keep close hands on the Forest Service, most
likely regarding the Spotted Owl, but perhaps the Vision document as well. 
Special Interest Revision
Additional evidence of an
improper concerted action appeared when Mr. Sewell asserted in a sworn
statement and in an August 12, 1992 letter to the Subcommittee that he and his
staff did not revise or take control of the DRAFT Vision document. In his sworn
statement, Mr. Sewell stated that during a June 7, 1991 briefing on the DRAFT
Vision document attended by Ms. Mintzmyer, Ms. Key, Director Ridenour, Mr. Jim
Loach, Ms. Mary Bradford, and Mr. Behler, Mr. Sewell saw the revised DRAFT
Vision document for the first time. He further asserted that all the changes to
the revised DRAFT Vision document had taken place prior
to his review of the
revised DRAFT document on June 7, 1991.
The only change that came out of
that June 7, 1991 meeting, there was only one change, and that was my clean air
recommendation. Everything else had taken place before I ever saw the document.
So, to say, first of all that our office had done it is not true, or to even infer that we
pressured that it be changed the way it was is not true, it's a falsehood. And
if I had done it, I would tell you right now because I had the authority to do
it, and I could have done it over her objections if I had wanted to. All I had
to do was rewrite the document and sign my name to it, and I had that authority...  (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the air quality change, Mr.
Sewell noted another change he made to the document.
The second was that Ms. Mintzmyer
had planned to have public relations-public meetings on the document, public review
.... She had planned on having them in Seattle, Washington; Chicago; New York;
Atlanta; Washington, D.C.
was if you want to do this, have one in Washington, if you want, but have them
in Billings, Cody, Jackson Hole, where people are that live in that area that
would be impacted by the document, and I
think that was totally appropriate 
Mr. Sewell continued,
So, those are the only two
substantive comments I made to anyone ever about the entire document. Anyone who
alleges or states otherwise has lied.
Q. [Mr. Schaff] Okay. She
A. [Mr. Sewell] Or even infers has
Sewell was adamant in his protests that, with the exception of the improved
air quality standard, all other changes to the document took place prior to his
review on June 7, 1991, and without Mr. Sewell's or his staffs' involvement.
August 12, 1992 letter to the Subcommittee, Mr. Sewell was even more emphatic
about his alleged lack of involvement with the DRAFT document: "During
that period [following the October 4, 1990 meeting] my role was to gather
comments, not to revise
Subcommittee has uncovered evidence to the contrary. Mr. Sewell's office
clearly was making substantive revisions to the document well before June 1991
and Mr. Sewell had reviewed those changes prior to June of 1991. Document #122
indicates that Mr. Sewell's involvement and his office's involvement extended
well past the two comments he testified to under oath and his assertions in the
August 1992 letter to the Subcommittee. Document #122 shows that Mr. Sewell's
staff was changing the DRAFT Vision document after the October 4, 1990 meeting
and that Mr. Sewell was personally reviewing those changes as early as November of 1990.
Bradford, then staff assistant for the Office of Fish and Wildlife and Parks,
Department of Interior, wrote in a November 14, 1990 revised DRAFT Vision
document transmittal memo 
to Ms. Constance Harriman, then Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, that changes were being made to the Vision document pursuant to Mr. Sewell's meeting
with "Sens. Simpson, Wallop and commodities groups." Ms. Bradford's
transmittal memo also contradicts Mr. Sewell's sworn assertion that he first
reviewed the revised Vision document on June 7, 1991; Ms. Bradford specifically
noted on November 14, 1990 that "Scott is now reviewing this."
Ms. Bradford's DRAFT Vision
document transmittal memo is not the only document to conflict with Mr. Sewell's
assertion that June 7, 1991 was the first time he made a change to the DRAFT
Vision document. Document #78, a revised copy of the DRAFT Vision document, has
a notation that reads, "Annotated-Preliminary Review 10/90. Returned with
Sewell changes 3/20/91." This annotation indicates that Mr. Sewell had
made changes to the DRAFT Vision document almost three months prior to the date
he claims to have
first made a change to the text of the document, in June of 1991.
Finally, document #57, a computer message written by Jack Troyer
to Gary Cargill on May 28, 1991, stated, "NPS is trying to get their
briefing ASAP because Scott Sewell has been their Department contact and he'll be leaving soon. . .
." (Emphasis added.) Mr. Cargill also confirmed that Mr. Sewell was the
Department of Interior contact as early as April 1991. This document and Mr. Cargill's
assertion directly conflict with Mr. Sewell's denial of being in control of the
DRAFT Vision document or even having had contact with the DRAFT document before
The Working Group
Once Mr. Sewell became aware of the above mentioned documents, he
developed an alternative explanation for them in his August 1992 letter to the
Subcommittee. Instead of maintaining his original story of not having any involvement
with the DRAFT document-other than two comments regarding strengthening the
air quality section and stopping national public meetings-Mr. Sewell instead
asserted that he had established a working group to gather comments:
During that period my role was to gather comments, not to revise the document. To
expedite the process, I established a working group consisting of Mary
Bradford, James Loach, Joseph Doddridge and Mary Kimbro. To my knowledge, the
working group met no more than four or five times. The working group's role
was twofold: (1) to review the document for policy consistency, and (2) to
compile the lists of the comments received from other offices or parties.
First, this statement conflicts with both document #122, which
states that the working group did revise the DRAFT Vision document and Mr. Sewell did review those changes, and it
conflicts with Mr. Sewell's sworn statement, which quoted him as saying:
"So, to say, first of all, that our office had done it [revised the DRAFT
Vision document] is not true." 
Next, Mr. Sewell's August 12, 1992 statement is contradictory on
its face. First, Mr. Sewell asserts he was just compiling comments, not
revising the document. If this were true, Mr. Sewell should not have had a
reason to form a four person working group that reviewed the DRAFT document
for policy consistency. In addition, a working group meeting four or five times  within a one month
period is an intensive review for a document Mr. Sewell characterized as
"not a policy priority." 
An additional inconsistency in Mr.
Sewell's explanation is reflected in the behavior of the leader of the working
group, Ms. Bradford. Ms. Bradford tried to present a different story of the
working group's revisions to the DRAFT Vision document after documents detailing the working group's
involvement in the DRAFT document's revision were released.
Prior to Ms. Bradford's and Mr.
Sewell's August 1992 explanations, documents obtained by the Subcommittee
captured the following story: On October 23, 1990, Ms. Bradford was given the
following instructions for the working group to follow from Mr. Sewell:
"SSS wants us to go through the document-don't deal with inside park
boundaries. TONE of document needs to be addressed. Focus on DOI issues." 
Another member of the working group, Meredith Kimbro, left no mistake as to the
meaning of Mr. Sewell's instructions: "[M]r. Sewell indicated he wanted us
to review it [DRAFT Vision document] for tone and overall Departmental
After following Mr. Sewell's October 23, 1990 instructions, on November 14,
1990 Ms. Bradford acknowledged the working group's revisions to the DRAFT
Vision document and Mr. Sewell's review of those revisions in a memo to then
Assistant Secretary Harriman.
After release of the
Subcommittee's documents, however, Ms. Bradford, in a July 22, 1992 unsworn
statement submitted to the Subcommittee on August 12, 1992, attempted to
indicate a different task for the working group:
group's work ... was merely to look at the document and try to incorporate
views received from other Departmental agencies, as received from the Office of Environmental Affairs
This statement is problematic for
two reasons: first, documents #122 and #130 show that Ms. Bradford's group was
revising the document--despite Mr. Sewell's various denials--in accordance with
the Wyoming Congressional delegation's and commodity and special interest
groups' requests. Second, that statement also contradicts Mr. Sewell's
assertion that the working group merely "compiled the lists of the various
Department's comments." Instead, even Ms. Bradford's latest statement
shows the group definitely was doing more than compiling comments-it was
revising the DRAFT document in accordance with the views received from other
Departmental agencies-something Mr. Sewell said, under oath, did not happen.
While Mr. Sewell and Ms. Bradford
gave three different explanations for the working group's activities, Mr. Jim
Loach added a fourth explanation: "Our objectives as I understood them
were to clarify its [DRAFT Vision document] definitions, assure other appropriate
bureaus currently omitted by the document were involved as necessary in the
verbiage of the document, and edit where necessary." 
In a final blow
to Mr. Sewell's characterization of the working group's purpose, Mr. Troyer
told the Subcommittee investigators that Ms. Bradford sent a revised DRAFT
Vision document to the Forest Service in the winter of 1990.
Mr. Troyer's story was independently
confirmed by Ms. Mintzmyer. In a documented phone conversation between Ms. Key
and Ms. Mintzmyer, Ms. Key told Ms. Mintzmyer on December 4, 1990 that Ms.
Bradford had sent a rewrite of the DRAFT Vision document to the Forest Service.
Thus, the four shifting
explanations for the working group's activities coupled with the fact that all
of the explanations were in conflict with the contemporaneous documentation of
the working group's activities and Mr. Troyer's confirmation that Ms. Bradford
sent a revised DRAFT Vision document to the Forest Service in December of
1990, shows that Mr. Sewell's denial of his office revising the DRAFT document
Finally, the Subcommittee again
notes the absence of the above mentioned intermediate Vision document drafts,
transmission memos, and contemporaneous documents from the working group, Mr.
Sewell, Ms. Bradford, or the Department of Interior.
Another compelling piece of
evidence revealing an operation to destroy the DRAFT Vision document occurred when
Ms. Mintzmyer was accused of lobbying Congress immediately after protesting
Mr. Sewell's gutting of the DRAFT Vision document. Ms. Mintzmyer testified to
the following scenario:
During the period of February 14 to 22, 1991.... I had occasion
to brief people on the Hill prior to appropriation and legislative hearings.
This was a standard practice. A copy of my schedule, names and times, was
furnished to the Washington office, Legislative Affairs Division, of the
National Park Service.
Immediately after these briefings, something quite unusual
occurred. I was informed that an undisclosed Member of Congress had told
Secretary Lujan I was lobbying. In a baffling turn of events, I was
mysteriously facing a demand for a letter of reprimand and discipline at the
insistence of Mr. Sewell.... [T]he message to me was clear. I felt threatened
by the allegation and particularly the call for a letter of reprimand.
On March 21, 1991, the issue of Mr. Sewell's demand that I
be reprimanded was raised in a meeting with the Director and members of his
staff. I noted that this was a groundless attack. Though I sent a memo to the
Director of this charge, I have never received any word of response. To this
day, the matter has never been formally explained to me, nor has the role of
officials involved with the Vision document.
I submit to the Committee that it appears clear that, had I
not flatly rejected this issue and had I not been lucky enough to clear my efforts
with both the Washington office and the Director, this could have served as a
basis for explaining a subsequent directed reassignment.
In his sworn statement, Mr. Sewell
described the lobbying charge in a contrary manner:
The whole lobbying thing concerned
me greatly. It is unheard of for somebody to spend two weeks in Washington
without ever coming by the department, visiting with members of Congress,
senior and junior appropriations staffers, and then passing out policy
documents which do not reflect departmental positions, and a number of them
are the exact opposite of what officially established Park policy is. That is
what is considered inappropriate.
I told the
Director to tell her to stop illegally lobbying Congress which is what, in my opinion, she was doing.
Sewell's accusations of lobbying are unsubstantiated. First, Ms. Mintzmyer's
memo requesting a response to the charge of lobbying was never answered. In
fact, the charges were never documented and Ms. Mintzmyer was never
reprimanded for her activities. Once she provided proof that the charges were
groundless, the whole matter faded.
unbeknownst to Mr. Sewell, Ms. Mintzmyer had a management trainee, Bill
Sontag, accompany her to her meetings with Congressional Representatives and
their staff. Mr. Sontag was training to become a National Park Service
superintendent and he went with Ms. Mintzmyer to learn exactly how to conduct
Ms. Mintzmyer took detailed notes of her conversations with the various
Congressional offices. Nothing in the memo she prepared summarizing her
meetings indicated any illegal activities. In fact, the memo discussed the
various concerns and requests the Congressional offices had made.
It is clear from the evidence that
this was another attempt to move Ms. Mintzmyer out of her position as Director
of the Rocky Mountain region.
The June 7, 1991 Meeting
The final element of the operation fell apart when the Subcommittee
examined a conflict that appeared between a memo Ms. Mintzmyer circulated
summarizing a June 7, 1991 meeting and a subsequent memo written by Mr. Sewell
contradicting Ms. Mintzmyer's earlier memo. Witnesses told Subcommittee
investigators on June 7, 1991 that Ms. Mintzmyer and Ms. Key briefed Mr. Sewell,
Director Ridenour, Mr. Loach, Ms. Bradford, and Mr. Behler regarding the
status of the revised DRAFT Vision document. In a June 14, 1991 memo 
summarizing that meeting, Ms. Mintzmyer noted that Mr. Sewell would check to
see if further review was required within the Department of Interior; that Mr.
Sewell had already received input from other agencies within DOI and it was
unnecessary to repeat that step; that Mr. Sewell would contact the Department
of Agriculture to communicate DOI's changes; and that the air quality standards
in the DRAFT document would be enhanced.
to Ms. Mintzmyer's memo, Mr. Sewell responded with a memo on June 28, 1991  denying his involvement with the DRAFT Vision document, claiming it was
an internal National Park Service document, and criticizing Ms. Mintzmyer's
Sewell's denial of the June 14, 1991 document is disingenuous. Documents and
interviews with Subcommittee investigators reveal that Ms. Mintzmyer's
characterization of the events of June 7, 1991 were accurate.
interview by Subcommittee investigators with Ms. Key on October 29, 1991, Ms.
Key confirmed the contents of the June 14, 1991 memo. Ms. Key said she drafted
the memo for Ms. Mintzmyer's signature, recapping the meeting's events 
. Document #51a, notes taken by Mr. Behler during the June 14, 1991
meeting, confirm Ms. Mintzmyer's June 14, 1991 memo and throw Mr. Sewell's
subsequent memo into doubt 
Mintzmyer became aware of Mr. Sewell's June 28, 1991 memo only after she
testified under oath before the Subcommittee. This chain of events leads to
the conclusion that Mr. Sewell's June 28, 1991 memo was not an accurate account
of the events.
Thus, the concerted activity to
eviscerate the DRAFT Vision document unraveled on a number of fronts:
October 4, 1990 meeting was the first element to unravel when participants to
the meeting gave several explanations for the purpose of the meeting and could
not substantiate those explanations with any documents, contemporaneous or
next element unraveled when Mr. Sewell could not back up his claim that he
never told Ms. Mintzmyer that the DRAFT Vision document was a political
disaster and had to be completely rewritten. On the other hand, Ms. Mintzmyer's
account was proven by documents and witnesses.
third element fell apart when Mr. Sewell and the working group Mr. Sewell
assembled to revise the DRAFT Vision document gave four separate, conflicting
accounts of the group's mission.
Documents detailing Mr. Sewell's and his office's involvement in revising the
DRAFT Vision document in November of 1990 unraveled the fourth element of the
operation-that Mr. Sewell and his office had no part in revising the DRAFT
Vision document until June 7, 1991.
fifth element of the operation, attacking Ms. Mintzmyer for lobbying, came
undone when Ms. Mintzmyer countered the lobbying charge and the charge
final cover up activity of the operation, Mr. Sewell's inaccurate June 28, 1991
memo portraying the events of the June 7, 1991 meeting, became suspect when
witnesses and documents sustained Ms. Mintzmyer's account the meeting.
CHAPTER 5-BRUSHING ASIDE LORRAINE
Following her opposition to Mr. Sewell's directions for the DRAFT
Vision document in the late fall of 1990 and the attempt to frame her for
lobbying in February of 1991, Ms. Mintzmyer heard that someone "high up in
Interior" had prompted the Executive Review Board 
(ERB) to propose a reassignment of three regional directors as a means of
neutralizing Ms. Mintzmyer. When Ms. Mintzmyer did receive her directed
reassignment, she was initially told that the reason for the directed
reassignment was due to a newly created policy requiring reassignments of upper
level managers who had been in one position for 10 years or more.
At first, Ms. Mintzmyer did not believe this rumor because SES
guidelines specifically prohibit reassignments triggered by specific time
periods. Senior Executive Service regulation S5-1(d)(6) provides for the
Mobility is not required or
expected of all executives, and agencies should not impose
arbitrary time-in-job limits to trigger moves. (Emphasis added)
Further, Ms. Mintzmyer had informed the Director that she would be
retiring in 1993. This meant that she would be in the new region only two years
and it would cost the government tens of thousands of dollars to move her to
Philadelphia and then return her to her home in Denver at the end of the two
year period. Finally, she had already moved five times in seven years for the
National Park Service in the course of her 32 year career.
On June 25, 1991, rumor became a reality. Ms. Mintzmyer, Mr.
Coleman and Mr. Baker all received letters announcing their directed
reassignments. Although the stories as to where the ten year
rule originated shifted several times, it is clear from reviewing the evidence
that it was Department of Interior officials who had suddenly imposed the ten
year trigger rule. The Department of Interior took the following steps in
developing the ten year trigger rule: 1) DOI examined the personnel
files-including Ms. Mintzmyer's-of SES employees in the National Park Service,
2) DOI officials approached the Director of the National Park Service and
other officials regarding the proposed rule, and 3) DOI's Executive Review
Board suggested a move of SES regional directors who had occupied their
position for ten years or more.
Director Ridenour confirmed, under oath, that
the ERB within the
Department of Interior developed the ten year rotation rule.
A. [Director Ridenour] [T]here was
talk in meeting with the ERB that philosophically we should not have our
management people in long term assignments, that they should have a rotation.
Q. [Schaff] And who in the ERB
told you that?
A. [I]t would have been Mr. Kay,
John Schrote, Tom Weimer.
A. [t]hey noted in looking at the
records that we had three regional directors who had been in their positions
approximately ten years.... So there were three that obviously stood out from
the rest in terms of how long they had been at their assignment.
Over the course of the next few months,
as this position was challenged as a pretextual reason for reassigning Ms.
Mintzmyer, both the National Park Service and the Department of Interior offered
as many as twelve shifting stories as to who ordered the reassignment, why it
was ordered, and what documentation was generated in making the decision.
One of the first stories appeared
in a newspaper article on July 6, 1991. The National Park Service was quoted in
this article as indicating that it was the NPS which adopted the ten year
trigger rule based on recommendations from an undisclosed source. Mr. George
Berklacy, Chief of the Office of Public Affairs for the National Park Service,
responded, "The Park Service, responding to recommendations ... to
implement the mobility features of that SES program, identified individuals who
have 10 or more years in their present positions." 
Twenty days later, the National
Park Service changed its story slightly. On July 26, 1991 Mr. Berklacy said it
was the National Park Service who developed and instituted the ten year trigger
rule on its own initiative. "Berklacy said Park Service Director James M.
Ridenour had decided that all senior executives with more than 10 years in the
same post should be transferred; Coleman, Baker and Mintzmyer fit the
bill."  No mention was made that the Director based his decision on
"recommendations" from an undisclosed source.
Less than a week later after the
initial story was questioned by Ms. Mintzmyer, on August 1, 1991, the National
Park Services story changed once again. First, NPS said its ten year trigger
rule was adopted pursuant to outside "recommendations." Then the National
Park Service said that it was the Director who developed and instituted the 10
year rule. On August 1, 1991 Mr. Berklacy ascribed the rule to a totally
different source, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
Berklacy said the Office of
Personnel Management (former Civil Service Administration), decided many had
not been mobile and
directed policy shifts of SES officials with more than ten years in a place;
Coleman, Baker and Mintzmyer all fit the description." 
On that same day, August 1, 1991,
Mr. Edward Davis, Associate Director for Budget and Administration for the
National Park Service, sent Ms. Mintzmyer a contradictory memo stating that the
Director of the National Park Service instituted the 10 year trigger rule and
further, that there weren't any documents related to this decision. Mr. Davis
did not attribute the rule to OPM.
In response to your request,
there are no documents, studies or other materials related to the decision to
Directors with experience in
excess of 10 years. The decision including the amount of time Regional
Directors had been in
their current positions . . . . 
By this time Ms. Mintzmyer was
seriously challenging this story. Eleven days later, however, Mr. Davis told an
EEO investigator that the 10 year trigger rule wasn't the reason for Ms. Mintzmyer's
Mr. Davis proffered that there is
no official regulation requiring 10-year rotations of SES employees and that it
was the Director's determination that the complainant's reassignment is in the
best interest of the Service.
In an amazing turn around, Mr.
Davis did not deny the existence of a ten year rule and wrote a constituent on
August 29, 1991,
[T]he National Park Service's
policy is that Senior Executive Service (SES) employees will rotate after 10
years in a given position. Ms. Mintzmyer has been in the Denver post for 11
years and her reassignment coordinates well with the reassignment of two of
our other Regional Directors.
By this time the source and
documentation for the improper rule was being vigorously questioned. On
September 14, 1991, the Department of Interior, not the National Park Service,
claimed that the ten year rule was ordinary business, undertaken by the Secretary-again
without any documentation.
"None of the actions are
based on retribution," said Steve Goldstein, spokesman for Interior
Secretary Manuel Lujan, who oversees the Park Service. Goldstein said
Mintzmyer's transfer was part of a three-way reassignment.
Goldstein said Lujan inaugurated
a policy of moving senior executives who have been on the job for more than 10
years so "a fresh perspective can be brought to bear." 
On the morning of March 23, 1992, Mr. S.
Scott Sewell, Department of Interior, attempted to disavow the ten year rule
in a sworn statement before
EEO investigator Davis Schaff.
[Mr. Sewell] [I] don't recall there being a 10-year trigger, so-called trigger.
It was just at some point it's good to rotate people. That was kind of the gist
then the only time that the 10 year thing came up was much later, to my
knowledge, when somebody made a reference that the three of them had all been
there over 10 years, but that wasn't the basis for the decision.
[Mr. Schaff] Oh, so the length of time that the person was at their position was
not taken into consideration in the reassignments?
Not the whole group-well, I'm sure with the reassignments, not as a group, not
as a policy, the fact that they had been there quite awhile, yes, that had
been, and each one probably was looked at individually.
On the same day in the afternoon
of March 23, 1992, Director Ridenour flatly contradicted Mr. Sewell when he
stated under oath to Mr. Schaff,
[Director Ridenour] [T]here was talk in meeting with the ERB that
philosophically we should not have our management people in long term
assignments, that they should have a rotation.... [T]hey [the ERB] noted in
looking at the records that we had three regional directors who had been in
their positions approximately ten years.... So there were three that obviously
stood out from the rest in terms of how long they had been at their assignment.
Two months later on May 6, 1992,
Director Ridenour confirmed that the National Park Service did have a policy of
rotating SES employees who had retained the same position in excess of 10
Ridenour had called the "directed transfers" of
three regional directors last fall-the individuals had to accept the moves,
take lower-paying jobs or leave the agency-part of a policy to rotate those
highly experienced members of the agency's Senior Executive Service who had
more than 10 years in one job.
Despite Mr. Goldstein's denial
that the ten year trigger rule was not a Department of Interior creation, on
June 2, 1992, the Department of Interior again claimed responsibility for the
ten year rule.
But Walker [Interior Department
official] said Mintzmyer was part of a "three-way rotation" carried
out because Interior
officials wanted to
"revitalize leadership in places where people have been in place for more
than 10 years." 
Finally, on June 20, 1992, the
Director again confirmed the existence of a ten year trigger rule, despite Mr.
Sewell's assertion that there had never been a ten year trigger rule.
said Friday that Mintzmyer was one of three regional directors who were
transferred because they had been in their posts for 10 years.
In summing up these different reasons for Ms. Mintzmyer's directed
reassignment, the following facts are known beyond question:
1. Although various stories stated that the National Park Service
developed the 10 year rotation rule, the
Subcommittee has not received one single document, study, memorandum, or other
item of evidence which suggests that the National Park Service ever
considered this option in the normal course of the policy-making process.
2. The action directly
violated the applicable SES regulation.
3. Ms. Mintzmyer had indicated her desire to retire in 1993
approximately one month prior to receiving her directed reassignment, making it
a costly transfer in terms of relocation money.
4. An almost identical directed reassignment was applied to Mr.
Mumma within days of the action against Ms. Mintzmyer.
After demonstrating that the reasons for Ms. Mintzmyer's directed
reassignment shifted twelve times, the evidence shows that the ten year trigger
rule was used as a pretext for reassigning Ms. Mintzmyer.
Retaliating against Ms. Mintzmyer and covering up the improper
concerted activity did not end when Ms. Mintzmyer received notice of her reassignment.
On June 24, 1991, Ms. Mintzmyer was told that she would receive a letter
ordering her compliance with a directed reassignment. While this letter was
pending, agency personnel and spokesmen made false statements to the effect
that Ms. Mintzmyer was not being involuntarily transferred, but rather she had
an option as to whether or not to accept the transfer.
The statements by agency personnel soon proved to be false. On
June 25, 1991, Ms. Mintzmyer received a letter  which threatened her with removal if she did anything other than accept
the reassignment. This move was retaliatory because the Department did not
furnish any evidence that a similar letter was ever used in any prior personnel
action involving someone of Ms. Mintzmyer's level.
The retaliation against Ms. Mintzmyer became more severe as time
progressed. In August of 1991, a congressional staffer was approached by Mr.
Herb Cables, Deputy Director for the National Park Service, regarding Ms.
Mintzmyer's directed reassignment. During this meeting, Mr. Cables disclosed confidential
information regarding the Equal Employment Opportunity position of Ms.
Mintzmyer and presented a highly irregular offer for the congressional staffer
to pass along to Ms. Mintzmyer, warning that this offer could not be conveyed
to Ms. Mintzmyer's attorney. The staffer wrote the following:
He ['Mr. Cables] asked me to
convey to Ms. Mintzmyer the following message: The Director wants to talk to
you, wants to work out [your staying in] Denver but off the record. [He]
doesn't want a transcript with the lawyer [after the conversation]. Mr. Cables
also said that they [he and the Director] were quite certain that they could get
Ms. Mintzmyer a SES position [in Denver]
in another 6 months. I understood my role was to pass on the message for a
discussion between the Director and Ms. Mintzmyer.
He said he
didn't want to see a transcript [of any conversation between Ms. Mintzmyer and
the Director] from Ms. Mintzmyer's lawyer and that she wasn't to discuss it
with her lawyer. 
Again, the only conclusion which can be
reached regarding such behavior by the National Park Service and its officials
and is consistent with all of the eyewitnesses and documentary evidence is
that officials of the Department of Interior had targeted Ms. Mintzmyer for
removal from the Denver position. She was removed from this position so she
would not be able to protect the Vision document. In addition, the Department was including the National
Park Service in the cover-up.
In the end, despite the personal
hardships, Ms. Mintzmyer accepted the ultimatum and transferred to
Philadelphia. In Philadelphia,
Ms. Mintzmyer was still subjected to retaliation for disclosing Mr. Sewell's
attempts to destroy the DRAFT Vision document. The National Park Service
hounded Ms. Mintzmyer by repeatedly denying a personnel action to a subordinate
Ms. Mintzmyer clearly felt was deserved. This personnel action was an inherited
situation, but Ms. Mintzmyer's was unable to get closure for her employee and was
repeatedly stopped in every effort she underwent to obtain a resolution. Ms.
Mintzmyer eventually resigned rather than be placed in a position where her
employees were being adversely affected because of her situation. 
Finally, Ms. Mintzmyer was retaliated
against when the Executive Review Board denied her a year-end bonus. On August
8, 1991 the Director of the Park Service recommended Ms. Mintzmyer for a bonus.
Additionally, the Director felt Ms. Mintzmyer had qualified for and was due an
SES step increase and he recommended a step increase for Ms. Mintzmyer to the
Executive Review Board.
Subsequently, Ms. Mintzmyer
discovered that the ERB had denied her raise and step increase. These denials
can be construed as retaliatory because previous to this denial, Ms. Mintzmyer
had been recommended for such bonuses, and had always been awarded the bonuses.
Ms. Mintzmyer's denial of a step
increase was also retaliatory. Ms. Mintzmyer was an exemplary civil servant.
She received the two highest awards offered in the Department during the course
of her career. That public service, coupled with her ten year responsibility
for the "crown jewels" of the National Park Service, made her a
likely candidate for a step increase. Both the denial of the bonus and the step
increase were likely in retaliation for Ms. Mintzmyer's protection of the DRAFT
In conclusion, the actions of the agency from March of 1991 to
March of 1992 reveal the following picture:
1. Ms. Mintzmyer opposed
destroying the DRAFT Vision document.
Mintzmyer made her reservations known to the Director, who in turn discussed
her problems with changing the DRAFT document with Mr. Sewell.
Sewell, acting in concert with others, attempted to frame Ms. Mintzmyer with a
lobbying charge either to force her to accept the changes to the DRAFT Vision
document or to remove her.
the lobbying attack failed, Department of Interior officials analyzed National
Park Service personnel records and formulated a plan to transfer her in direct
violation of SES regulations.
Department officials ordered NPS to implement the plan under the guise of an
ordinary three-way personnel move, even though there was no documentation,
studies, or evidence to suggest that this plan was an ordinary procedure.
caught in the various stories, and under the pressure of the reassignments
being totally unusual and violative of regulations, the National Park Service,
the Department of Interior, and Mr. Sewell invented a number of conflicting explanations
as to where and why Ms. Mintzmyer was reassigned.
Ms. Mintzmyer resisted the changes in the DRAFT document and filed an EEO
claim, extremely unfortunate methods-including an attempt to stop Ms. Mintzmyer
from consulting her attorney--were used.
"The Directed Reassignments
of John Mumma and L. Lorraine Mintzmyer," (Mintzmyer hearing) House
Subcommittee on the Civil Service, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service,
September 24, 1991. (For [Large File] Entire Original document in PDF click here.)
The term "commodity
groups" signifies those groups and businesses that advocate extracting
natural resources, such as timber and minerals, from public lands for private
By July 17, 1990, after
significant public comment, a sixty page working document known as the
"Vision for the Future: A Framework for Coordination in the Greater
Yellowstone Area" was published. When the word "DRAFT" appears,
it refers to the July 1990 version. This was the first and only full draft
version of the document that was circulated for public comment before a
reduced, ten page final was issued.
Today the GYCC consists of three
Regional Foresters, six National Forest Supervisors, one National Park Service
Regional Director, and two National Park Superintendents.
The public participated in a
variety of ways: open houses, speaking engagements, seminars, conferences,
newsletters, mailings, media events, and personal contacts.
For example, not one letter, facsimile, phone message, or other similar
document has been produced detailing or explaining how so many western special
interest lobbyists could have been coordinated for a Washington, D. C. meeting
with top level Department of Interior officials.
August 10, 1992 addendum to an unworn statement by Ms. Mary Bradford submitted
to the Subcommittee on the civil Service
on August 12, 1992.
11, 1992 unworn statement of Mr. Jim Loath, Associate Regional Director,
Park Service denies politics forcing shift of Regional Chief," Deseret
New, July 6, 1991, p.90.