IN THE SUPER COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

ELEANOR ABRAHAM et al., Plaintiffs, v. ST. CROIX RENAISSANCE GROUP, LLLP, Defendant.	CASE NO. 11-CV-550 **ACTION FOR DAMAGES** **COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION** JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
IN RE: RED MUD LITIGATION	MASTER CASE NO. SX-20-CV-009 **COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION**

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Plaintiffs, by and through undersigned counsel, move this Court to reconsider its order entered February 3, 2020, that Plaintiffs in this case and the putative master case, SX-20-CV-009, individually refile claims against Defendant St. Croix Renaissance Group,

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LLC (SCRG).[1] Based on this Court's incorrect interpretation of joinder in V.I.R. Civ. P. 20 and misjoinder in Rule 21, this Court has ordered that, notwithstanding the similarity of claims, members of the same family, residing in the same household, cannot join in the same pleading. The unprecedented nature of this Court's order is obvious when one considers that, under the Order, not even a husband and wife, residing in the same home and with identical claims, can join in a pleading.

This Court's Order, misinterpreting and misapplying Rules 20 and 21, has essentially written the permissive joinder rule (Rule 20) out of Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Reconsideration Standard

Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 6-4 provides that a party may move a court to reconsider an order. According to the rule, "[a] motion to reconsider must be based on: (1) intervening change in controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence; (3) the need to correct clear error of law; or (4) failure of the court to address an issue specifically raised prior to the court's ruling. Where ground (4) is relied upon, a party must specifically point

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[1] This Court also severed the cases against SCRG consolidated under In RE: Red Dust Litigation, MASTER CASE NO. SX-15-CV-620. SCRG has also moved this Court to reconsider the February 3, 2020 Order on various grounds. By separate notice of joinder, Plaintiffs join in this motion to reconsider but only as to certain issues raised by SCRG.

out in the motion for reconsideration wherein the record of the proceedings the particular issue was actually raised before the court."

II. Rule 20 Permissive Joinder Standard

Rule 20 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure which governs permissive joinder provides in relevant part as follows:

> (a) Persons Who May Join or Be Joined.
> (1) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
> (A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
> (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.
> ...
> (3) Extent of Relief. Neither a plaintiff nor a defendant need be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. The court may grant judgment to one or more plaintiffs according to their rights, and against one or more defendants according to their liabilities.

See In re Adoption of Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, 2017 WL 1293844, at *40 (V.I. April 3, 2017).

The Reporter's Note to V.I.R.Civ.P. 20 states in relevant part that

> Rule 20 is the "permissive joinder" provision. Under Subpart (a) multiple plaintiff's may join in one action if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, so long as there is at least one question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs. ...

See In re Adoption of Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, at *41.

Courts in the Virgin Islands and elsewhere recognize that permissive joinder rules

such as Rule 20[2] are to be construed liberally in order to effectuate the policy behind permissive joinder rules in favor of broad joinder. *See Mosley v. General Motors Corp.*, 497 F.2d 1330, 1332–1334 (8th Cir. 1974)("The purpose of the rule is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits. ... Single trials generally tend to lessen the delay, expense and inconvenience to all concerned. Reflecting this policy, the Supreme Court has said: 'Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.'"), *citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966), and 7 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1652 at 265 (1972). *Accord Hagan v. Rogers*, 570 F.3d 146, 153 (3rd Cir. 2009)(same); *Hamed v. Yusuf*, 2016 WL 11639571, at *3 (V.I.Super. May 6, 2016)("Federal Rule 20 'is construed very liberally ...'"), *quoting Poleon v. GMC*, 42 V.I. 393, 394 (D.V.I. 2000); *Vanover v. NCO Financial Services, Inc.*, 857 F.3d 833, 839 (11th Cir. 2017)(Joinder is strongly encouraged and the rules are construed generously toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties)(internal citations and quotations omitted);

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[2] The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has recognized that decisions of federal courts interpreting a rule of federal civil procedure identical in language to a Virgin Islands rule of civil procedure represent persuasive authority in interpreting the V.I. rule. *See Yearwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Antilles Gas Corp.*, 69 V.I. 863, 869–870 (V.I. 2018).

Acevedo v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2010)("Under the Rules, the impulse is towards entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.")(internal citations and quotations omitted); *Grover v. BMW of North America, LLC*, 2020 WL 348653, at *3 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 21, 2020)*("*Joinder is generally favored under the federal rules. ... Joinder promote[s] trial convenience and expedite[s] the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits. Single trials generally tend to lessen the delay, expense[,] and inconvenience to all concerned. ... Therefore, when exercising its discretion under Rule 20, trial courts should 'accord a liberal interpretation to the requirements in order to prevent unnecessary multiple lawsuits.'")(internal citations and quotations omitted); *Petersen v. Bank of America Corp.*, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 338, 232 Cal.App.4th 238, 249 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2014) (statutes relating to joinder should be liberally construed, unless expressly forbidden, to the end that a multiplicity of suits may be prevented.); *Branham v. YBE Oxford, LLC*, 2013 WL 120648, at *2 (N.D.Ala. Jan. 4, 2013)("Plainly, the central purpose of Rule 20 is to promote trial convenience and expedite the resolution of disputes, thereby eliminating unnecessary lawsuits.")(internal citations omitted); *United of Omaha v. Hieber*, 653 N.E.2d 83, 87 (Ind.App. 3 Dist. 1995)(The purpose of [the Indiana permissive joinder rule] is to promote trial convenience, expedite claims, and avoid multiple lawsuits and to accomplish these ends, Indiana courts give such

provision the broadest possible reading)(internal citations omitted); *Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering, B.V.*, 761 P.2d 662, 669 (Wyo. 1988)(state supreme court, after stating that Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 is identical to Wyoming's permissive joinder rule, recognized that the general philosophy of the joinder provisions of the federal rules is to allow virtually unlimited joinder at the pleading stage but to give the district court discretion to shape the trial to the necessities of the particular case)(internal citations and quotations omitted); *Aetna Ins. Co. v. Carroll's Transfer, Inc.*, 188 S.E.2d 612, 614 (N.C.App. 1972)(basic philosophy of the party joinder provisions is to allow relatively unrestricted initial joinder); and *Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co.*, 291 F.Supp. 705, 711 (D.Minn. 1968), *citing* 3A Moore, Federal Practice, Para. 20.02 (2d Ed. 1968).

The "transaction or occurrence test" of Rule 20 permits "all reasonably related claims for relief" by or against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding, while absolute identity of all events is unnecessary. *In re Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.*, 2017 WL 4054144, at *3 (10th Cir. March 27, 2017); *Saval v. BL Ltd.*, 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983); *Mosley*, 497 F.2d at 1333; and *Riehm v. Engelking*, 2006 WL 8443479, at *2–3 (D.Minn. June 30, 2006).

"The phrase 'transaction or occurrence' is 'given a broad and liberal interpretation in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits.'" *Grover*, 2020 WL 348653, at *3, *quoting LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni of Lasa, Italy v. Alexander*, 414 F.2d 143, 147

(6th Cir. 1969); and *Petersen*, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d at 338, 232 Cal.App.4th at 249 (The requirement that the right to relief arise from the same transaction or series of transactions is construed broadly and it is sufficient if there is any factual relationship between the claims joined).

"Transaction is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship. ... Accordingly, all logically related events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence." *Mosley*, 497 F.2d at 1333. *Accord, In re Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.*, 2017 WL 4054144, at *3; *In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation*, 591 F.3d 613, 622-623 (8th Cir. 2010); and *Poleon*, 42 V.I. at 394-395.

The second requisite necessary to sustain a permissive joinder under Rule 20 is that a question of law or fact common to all parties will arise in the action. However Rule 20 does not require that all questions of law and fact raised by the dispute be common nor does it establish any qualitative or quantitative test of commonality and the construction of the commonality required by Rule 20 is given a permissive application so that common questions have been found to exist in a wide range of different contexts. *See Mosley*, 497 F.2d at 1334 (internal citations omitted), *citing* 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1763. *Accord Branham*, 2013 WL 120648, at *3; *Boomer Development, LLC*

v. National Association of Home Builders of United States, 325 F.R.D. 6, 19 (D.D.C. 2018); *Roeder v. DIRECTV, LLC*, 2017 WL 11458455, at *4–5 (N.D.Iowa Feb. 1, 2017); and *Dejesus v. Humana Insurance Company*, 2016 WL 3630258, at *5–6 (W.D.Ky. June 29, 2016).

In *Petersen*, the appellate court found that permissible joinder should be granted based on "commonality regarding liability, …", even if there was not commonality regarding damages "While the individual damages among these 965 plaintiffs of course vary widely, that is not the salient point. … The salient point is that *liability* is amenable to mass action treatment." *See Petersen*, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d at 341-342, 232 Cal.App.4th at 252-254 (internal citations omitted). The *Petersen* court recognized two overall policies of the law served by joinder there, each of which favored joinder, "One is access to justice. To require these plaintiffs to file separately not only clogs up the courts, but also deprives them of economies of scale otherwise available …" based on clearly common proof and experts, and "[t]he second is the conservation of judicial resources. There is an obvious burden to the trial court if joinder is *not* allowed.", and scarce judicial resources should be used in an efficient manner. *Id. See also Alumax Extrusions, Inc. v. Evans Transp. Co., Monon Trailer Div.*, 461 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ind.App. 3 Dist. 1984)("[I]t is in the parties' and the courts' interest to avoid circuitous and multiple lawsuits.").

As provided in Rule 20(a)(3), joinder is permissible even if the liability of each

defendant and the damages awarded to each plaintiff will differ. *See Wehlage v. EmpRes Healthcare Inc.*, 2012 WL 380364, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 6, 2012). "It is evident from the Rule itself that not all those joined as defendants need be interested in defending against all claims for relief nor must the plaintiff seek the same relief against each defendant." *See Kuechle v. Bishop*, 64 F.R.D. 179, 180 (N.D. Ohio, 1974), *citing* Moore's Federal Practice, ¶20.06. *Accord Wehlage*, 2012 WL 380364, at *3; and *Stone Age Foods, Inc. v. Exchange Bank*, 1997 WL 123248, at *2 (N.D.Cal. March 4, 1997). *See also Anaya*, 206 Cal.Rptr. at 523-524, 160 Cal.App.3d at 233-234 (appellate court found that common issues of fact and law abound such that all employees, their wives and children could be permissibly joined in action to recover damages because all plaintiffs alleged exposure to chemical from same location over the course of many years, and appellate court rejected defendants' claim there that difficulty a jury may have in keeping track of testimony of over 200 plaintiffs and other practical concerns constituted sufficient grounds for finding misjoinder of plaintiffs).

A court's order denying joinder or severing parties for an alleged failure to satisfy the joinder requirements of Rule 20 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *See Hagan*, 570 F.3d at 152, *citing Coughlin v. Rogers,* 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); *Mosley*, 497 F.2d at 1332; *Branham*, 2013 WL 120648, at *1; and *Riehm*, 2006 WL 8443479, at *3. *Accord Sanders v. Rose*, 576 Fed.Appx. 91, 94 (3rd Cir. Aug. 21, 2014)*; Boretsky v. Governor of*

New Jersey, 433 Fed.Appx. 73, 77, 2011 WL 2036440, at *2–3 (3rd Cir. May 25, 2011); and *Watson v. Blankinship*, 20 F.3d 383, 389 (10th Cir. 1994).

The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has held that an abuse of discretion occurs when a decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact. *See Fawkes v. Sarauw*, 66 V.I. 237, 242 (V.I. 2017), *citing Stevens v. People*, 55 V.I. 550, 556 (V.I. 2011); and *Schneider v. Fried*, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003). "'A [trial] court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.'" *See Molloy v. Independence Blue Cross*, 56 V.I. 155, 168 (V.I. 2012), *quoting*, *United States v. Thompson–Riviere,* 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009). The Virgin Islands Supreme Court also holds that a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise its discretion since a court may never exercise its discretion to simply ignore a claim that a party has brought squarely before it. *See Bryan v. Fawkes*, 61 V.I. 416, 476 (V.I. 2014), *citing Garcia v. Garcia,* 59 V.I. 758, 771 (V.I. 2013); and *Austin–Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,* 81 A.3d 200, 208 n. 11 (Conn. 2013).

Courts have clarified in the context of reviewing a trial court's order denying permissive joinder as to what constitutes an abuse of discretion. The Third Circuit, and district courts within the Third Circuit, have held that a district court abuses its discretion

when issuing an order regarding the joinder requirements of Rule 20 when such court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact. *See Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 543 F.3d 141, 147 (3rd Cir. 2008). *Accord Hagan*, 570 F.3d at 152; and *Turner v. Wetzel*, 2015 WL 5695305, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Sept, 28, 2015); and *Johnson v. Holt*, 2015 WL 3971807, at *5 (M.D.Pa. April 17, 2015).

Appellate courts have not hesitated under a wide range of circumstances to find that trial courts abused their discretion in denying permissive joinder. *See Sanders*, 576 Fed.Appx. at 94-95 (district court's decision to drop certain parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 constituted an abuse of discretion when the district court erred in concluding that second amended complaint failed to comply with Rule 20 and found that such complaint contained "claims that are completely unrelated and do not arise out of the same transaction."; the Third Circuit disagreed that the claims should have been raised in separate complaints when all incidents occurred within the course of a few months and all concerned plaintiff's treatment as a pretrial detainee in one prison); *Mosley*, 497 F.2d at 1334 (in case alleging a racially discriminatory policy, circuit court found that the district court abused its discretion in severing joined actions where the difficulties in ultimately adjudicating damages to various plaintiffs were not so overwhelming as to require severance with the case being remanded with directions to permit plaintiffs to proceed jointly); *N. Side Bank & Trust Co.*,

908 N.E.2d at 1046-1048 (trial court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to join two individuals as defendants after entry of judgment because the court's stated reason for denying motion - that joinder could expose the prospective defendants to criminal liability for assault - found no support in record and where the party seeking joinder lacked alternative remedies to obtain the relief for which joinder was being requested); *Pascagoula—Gautier School District v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County*, 212 So.3d 742, 750-751 (Miss. 2016)(majority of state supreme court, for different reasons, found that trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiffs to add Chevron as a defendant to the case with some members of the majority finding that Chevron through its participation in the suit waived the right to object to its joinder as a party)(internal citations omitted); *Petersen*, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d at 339-344, 232 Cal.App.4th at 251-256 (appellate court found trial court abused its discretion in denying permissive joinder since the point of permissive joinder provision is to allow joinder where any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise and the requirement that the right to relief arise from the same transaction or series of transactions is to be construed broadly and it is sufficient if there is any factual relationship between the claims joined. "[I]t is unfair to these plaintiffs to deprive them of commonalities of proof and witnesses inherent in their basic theory against [defendants]"); *Smith v. Vencare, Inc.*, 519 S.E.2d 735, 743 (Ga.App. 1999)(The trial court must exercise its sound discretion in allowing the addition of parties, and denial of joinder is

an abuse of discretion where delay is the sole reason for denial); *Alumax Extrusions,* 461 N.E.2d at 1168-1169 (appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling disallowing permissive joinder for abuse of discretion, where there were no "specifically articulated reasons given in support of the trial court's determination. …", and where "common questions of law and fact predominate this action and render joinder extremely important in order to provide efficient justice and protect [plaintiff] from a multiplicity of actions and overlapping liability based upon the same claimed injury); and *Abraham v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.*, 795 F.2d 238, 251 (2nd Cir 1986)(circuit court found district court abused its discretion in not permitting joinder of 75 plaintiffs in suit against defendant auto manufacturer where each plaintiff owned a model car from one of five different model years and although plaintiffs did not all suffer the same type of damage to their cars, each plaintiff alleged their damage was caused by a single defective part in the car produced by defendant and this common defect satisfied the same transaction or occurrence requirement because it was part of a series of logically related transactions and because it is indisputable that the plaintiffs seeking joinder raised common questions of law and fact). *See also Arrington v. City of Fairfield, Ala.*, 414 F.2d 687, 693 (5th Cir. 1969)(circuit court refused to affirm the denial of joinder as a proper exercise of the district court's discretion, reversed district court's ruling that executive director of housing authority, members of city council, members of planning commission and C. J. Donald were not proper parties, and remanded for the district court

to again review issue of parties under the evidence and law as it has developed, finding that "[u]pon the present state of the record this Court cannot say that these parties are not proper parties.").

a. Individual assessment of damages cannot bar refiling by household.

The "red dust/mud" plaintiffs make simple claims in their cases. They claim property damage to their homes and cisterns as a result of being inundated by red dust. They also claim acute, short term, physical symptoms due to the exposure to the dust as well as negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (*See* Exemplar Complaint, Exhibit 1 to SCRG's February 24, 2020 Motion to Reconsider). This Court, in its February 3, 2020 Order, did not explain why households cannot refile complaints, nor did the Cout provide a reasoned analysis[3] as to why households could not join in one pleading under Rule 20 and under the identical parameters of the similar litigation it. This Court previously found it prudent to have immediate family members join in one pleading. *Abednego v. St. Croix Alumina, LLC*, No. SX-09-CV-571, 2015 WL 4760285, at *19 (V.I. Super. Aug. 10, 2015)("Immediate family members, meaning persons who are married or presently

[3] A court also abuses its discretion if such court fails to provide a reasoned analysis that comports with the requirements of Rule 20 or if such court's analysis is not based on the specific fact pattern presented by the plaintiffs and claims before the court. *See Boretsky*, 433 Fed.Appx. at 77, 2011 WL 2036440, at *2, *citing Hagan*, 570 F.3d at 157.3 In determining on appeal whether a trial court has exercised "sound judicial discretion. ..." or has abused its discretion, "it is necessary to evaluate the action of the trial court upon the reasons it specifically articulated, rather than to attribute to it some legitimate but unexpressed reason." *Alumax Extrusions,* 461 N.E.2d at 1168 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

cohabitating as well as their children, may join together in one pleading....) And the plaintiffs have been unable to determine why the refiling requirements in *Abednego* shouldn't apply here as it relates to immediate family members joining in one pleading.

Without any motion to reconsider before it and without the benefit of plaintiffs' arguments or law, this Court denied a motion to reconsider the order that plaintiffs refile individual complaints. Plaintiffs can only surmise that this Court's concern rests upon the need for "individual assessment of damages." *See* Memo. Op. at p. 15. ("Joining over five hundred people as plaintiffs in the same case where each assert a personal tort that requires an individualized assessment of damages is misjoinder") However, that concern is not a valid reason to call pleadings filed by household misjoinder and Rule 20 envisions that persons joining in one pleading may have differing damages. For example, if four family members were involved in a motor vehicle accident, with the mother suffering a broken hip, the husband a head injury, and the children minor cuts and abrasions, there is no law to support the conclusion that because each family member suffered different damages and would require an "individual assessment of damages" they could not be joined in a single pleading in a subsequent lawsuit.

In *Anaya v. Superior Court,* 206 Cal.Rptr. 520, 521-523, 160 Cal.App.3d 228, 230-233 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1984), the appellate court found that the trial court should have allowed permissive joinder of 200 male employees, their wives and their children, based on

industrial contamination over 20 to 30 years to the hazardous effect of harmful chemicals from a chemical manufacturing plant since the plaintiffs' rights to relief arose out of having been exposed to harmful chemicals at one location over a period of many years by inhalation, drinking of water, and physical contact. "Thus, they were all involved in the same series of transactions or occurrences and assert rights to relief therefrom. The fact that each employee was not exposed on every occasion any other employee was exposed does not destroy the community of interest linking these petitioners." *Accord In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation*, 2016 WL 7644792, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 2016); and *Petersen*, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d at 339, 232 Cal.App.4th at 250.

Like *Anaya*, this Court's order that not even a husband and wife may join in a pleading is an abuse of discretion because it means that there would need to be almost 2,000 refiled complaints as opposed to approximately 550—a completely impracticable and unworkable mandate that does not adhere to the permissive joinder allowance under Rule 20. As demonstrated by the exemplar complaint, all persons in a household were involved in the same series of transactions that gave rise to this lawsuit, and any differences that may exist as to damages do not destroy the commonality of claims that allow for joinder under Rule 20. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reconsider its February 3, 2020 Order that plaintiffs refile all complaints individually.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
LEE J. ROHN AND ASSOCIATES, LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DATED: February 25, 2020

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD/PAGE COUNT

This document complies with the page or word limitation set forth in Rule 6-1 (e).

BY: _____
Lee J. Rohn, Esq.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on this 25 day of FEBRUARY, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing **MOTION TO RECONSIDER** to be served via ELECTRONIC MAIL upon:

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IN THE SUPER COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
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ORDER

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider dated February 25, 2020, and the Court having been advised in its premises, it is;

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is **GRANTED**, and further;

SO ORDERED this _____ day of _____ 2020.

_____
Judge of the Superior Court

ATTEST:
Tamara Charles
CLERK OF THE COURT

By: _____
Deputy Clerk

Date: _____

Distribution List:
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